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International differences in IFRS policy
choice: a research note
Erlend Kvaal and Christopher Nobes*
Abstract — Building on literature that suggests motives and opportunities for national versions of IFRS practice, we
examine whether there are systematic differences in IFRS accounting policies between countries. Using information from the
annual reports of companies in the blue chip indices of the largest five stockmarkets that use IFRS, we reject a null hypothesis
that IFRS practice is the same across countries. For 16 accounting policy issues, we find instead significant evidence that pre-
IFRS national practice continues where this is allowed within IFRS. By this, we document the existence of national patterns
of accounting within IFRS. We also point out some policy implications that arise from our findings.
Keywords: international standards; international differences; policy choice
1. Introduction
It has been suggested that there are motives and
opportunities for the survival of international
differences under International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Ball, 2006; Nobes,
2006; Zeff, 2007). This paper seeks to answer two
questions relating to this. First, are there systematic
differences between countries with respect to the
accounting policies that companies use within
IFRS, so that one can identify national IFRS
patterns? Second, if there are, can we explain how
policies were chosen on transition to IFRS?
We investigate these questions using the 2005–
06 IFRS annual reports of companies based in five
countries: Australia, France, Germany, Spain and
the UK. In all these countries, IFRS is compulsory,1
at least for the consolidated statements of listed
companies. Strictly speaking, it is EU-endorsed
IFRS2 that is compulsory for the EU companies,
and IFRS-based Australian standards that are
compulsory in Australia. This point presents one
of the drivers of different practices. Other oppor-
tunities for variety arise from options clearly
available within IFRS, and we concentrate on
these. Given the motives and opportunities for
national versions of IFRS, we expect to find such
differences in practice.
This paper contributes to the literature in a
number of ways. First, we document formally that
there are different national versions of IFRS
practice. Related to this, we show that companies
not only have an opportunity to pursue pre-IFRS
practices originating in their national GAAP,3 but
also extensively use this opportunity.
These findings are important for several reasons.
For financial statement users, they imply that full
international comparability has not yet arrived.
Therefore, it has been suggested, investors might be
misled by an apparent uniformity (Ball, 2006: 15).
As long as accounting standards contain options
and require use of judgment, some variation in
accounting practice is inevitable. However, the
existence of systematic differences in practice
related to national borderlines is clearly in conflict
with the objective of international harmonisation
and may mislead financial statement users who do
not pay attention to them. Some differences within
IFRS practice are observable and can be adjusted
for by alert analysts (e.g. the location of dividends
in a cash flow statement); other differences are
easily observable but cannot be adjusted for without
a large degree of estimation (e.g. the effects of the
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inventory flow method on profit, or the absence of a
gross profit figure in a by-nature income statement);
yet others are not observable (e.g. the application of
criteria for making impairments or for capitalising
development costs). Some users of financial state-
ments might be misled by even the first type of
differences, but many might be misled by the third
type. The second and third types create difficulties
for international comparative analysis.
There are also policy implications. First, the
IASB aims not just to issue standards but to
facilitate comparable information (IASCF, 2005).
This paper illustrates topics on which more work
would be needed to achieve this objective. Second,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is
monitoring the use of IFRS for foreign registrants
on US exchanges (SEC, 2008, II, D). Part of this
consideration includes an assessment of IFRS
practice from 2005, but we show that there are
several national versions of IFRS practice.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sum-
marises relevant literature; Section 3 draws on this
to state our main hypothesis and outline our
research design; Section 4 explains our selection
of countries, companies and accounting topics for
this; Sections 5 and 6 present detailed hypotheses
and results; and Section 7 draws interpretations and
conclusions.
2. Literature
One strand of literature that is relevant to what
follows is research on the motives and opportunities
for international differences in accounting before
the adoption of IFRS. This is examined in many
papers and textbooks. The objective of our paper is
not to try to explain pre-IFRS accounting differ-
ences. We ask, instead, whether there is evidence
that country-specific variables affect choices within
IFRS. To our knowledge there is no scientific
literature that addresses this issue.
Nobes (2006) summarises the literature on the
reasons for pre-IFRS accounting differences, asking
whether these reasons might continue to operate in
the context of transition to IFRS. A large number of
factors has been proposed as pre-IFRS influences.
The most proximate to accounting itself are legal
systems, taxation systems and financing systems.
These could still be relevant to IFRS practice. As
examples of the three influences in turn: monitoring
and enforcement of IFRS still depends on national
regulatory institutions; tax motivations can still
affect practice in unconsolidated statements, and
some of this might flow through to consolidated
statements; and companies in equity-finance coun-
tries might be the more interested in voluntary
disclosures.
The national literature on IFRS is also likely to
perpetuate national practices (e.g. PwC (2005) on
formats).4 Ball (2006: 15) suggests about IFRS that:
‘The fundamental reason for being sceptical
about uniformity of implementation in practice
is that the incentives of preparers (managers) and
enforcers (auditors, courts, regulators, boards,
block shareholders, politicians, analysts, rating
agencies, the press) remain primarily local.’
Commentators sometimes even argue in favour
of attempting to preserve a national flavour of IFRS
(Küting, 2007: 2557).
The international differences in accounting pol-
icies that we study mostly result from companies’
policy choices, and research on this subject is
potentially relevant to our work. Much of it is
directed at revealing the incentives and motivations
of such choices, e.g. in the context of earnings
management (for comprehensive literature reviews,
see Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Fields et al., 2001).
These perspectives are not so important for the
policy choices studied in this paper, because only a
few of our issues (pension accounting, fair value
option) affect the inter-period allocation of net
income. Closer to our study is the research that
explores the causes and effects of companies’
adopting high-quality GAAP. It is often argued
that companies accept the costs of such adoption in
order to reduce their cost of capital (Leuz and
Verrecchia, 2000; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001;
Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005). Although there is
ample evidence that voluntary adoption of IFRS has
enhanced accounting quality (Barth et al., 2006;
Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006), the benefits of man-
datory adoption are more doubtful (Daske et al.,
2007; Christensen et al., 2008). The importance of
an adequate institutional framework for reporting
incentives has also been emphasised (Ball, 2001;
Ball et al., 2000; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006).
Although this paper does not address the extent to
which companies reap the rewards of IFRS report-
ing, the tendency to preserve national practice that
we document may be one of the phenomena that
limit the benefits of common reporting require-
ments.
There is some professional literature on IFRS
practices from 2005 onwards. KPMG and von Keitz
(2006) focus on 199 IFRS reports of the largest
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 05 ABR Nobes.3d Page 174 of 188
4 This publication shows a financial position form of balance
sheet (like Format 1 in the UKCompanies Act) as an example of
IFRS practice.
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companies of ten countries (seven of them in the
EU), using year-ends of 2005 or before. The use of
those year-ends excludes the first implementation
by many UK companies,5 and also means that
countries such as Australia6 were excluded. The
KPMG study reports on the choice of options, in
some cases including a breakdown by country.
However, that study is not designed to produce a
formal comparison of practices between countries.
ICAEW (2007) reports on a survey of 200 listed
companies of all sizes across 24 EU countries for
2005–06. A similar report for 2006–2007 has also
been published (European Commission, 2008). In
general, the data in these reports on the choice of
options are aggregated rather than shown by
country, although there are some exceptions to that.
There is also some literature that records pre-
IFRS national practices (rather than investigating
motives for international differences in them) and
the differences between national GAAP and IFRS.
To explore this, we have consulted national laws
and standards, and analyses of them, such as
TRANSACC (2001). We have also looked at
surveys of practice, such as FEE (1991).
Differences between national rules and IFRS were
analysed by Nobes (2001), whose data form the
basis of a study of factors influencing the scale of
these differences by Ding et al. (2007).
3. General hypothesis and research design
The differences in IFRS practice that we study relate
to policy choices. We base our hypotheses on the
literature (of the previous section) that suggests that
companies tend to continue with their previous
national practices where this is possible under IFRS.
However, we note that there are four distinguishable
reasons for this. First, as explained above, the
underlying causes of previous differences between
national accounting practices (such as enforcement
systems) may still have scope to affect IFRS
practice. Essentially, many drivers of policy choice
remain national. Second, and relatedly, IFRS con-
solidated statements are drawn up from unconsoli-
dated statements. So, for example, the practices
required or chosen in the unconsolidated financial
statements of a German parent or a German
subsidiary under German law might flow through
to the consolidated IFRS financial statements where
the practices are permitted under IFRS. A third
reason is that directors of a group might try to
maintain consistent accounting policies over time,
despite the transition to IFRS, so as to create as
much continuity as possible for the users of the
financial statements. Fourth, and relatedly, the
directors might wish to minimise the number of
changes to their accounting systems, thereby redu-
cing the company’s costs of transition to IFRS, by
retaining pre-IFRS practices where possible.
A potential explanation for a particular predom-
inant pre-IFRS policy in a country might be the
importance of certain sectors in that country. For
example, perhaps a particular sector mostly uses
first in, first out (FIFO) inventory valuation which-
ever country it is in, and this sector is especially
strong in one country, making FIFO more than
averagely common there. Our prediction is that
FIFO would continue to be common in that country
under IFRS. However, this might mean that the
option was not being chosen in a way that reduced
international comparability among similar com-
panies. Nevertheless, as will be shown, many of the
international differences are so strong that sectoral
imbalances cannot explain them. For example, no
German company in our sample uses only FIFO in
its IFRS statements whereas half of the UK
companies do.
In order to discover whether internationally
different versions of IFRS practice exist, we
selected large companies from five major stock
markets and examined their IFRS policies for 16
issues. We propose the following null hypothesis:
IFRS practice is the same across all countries. We
test the null hypothesis against an alternative of
non-homogeneity by chi-square tests for each topic.
We further test the validity of the null hypothesis
against a number of alternative hypotheses that
predict national practice relating to each issue. The
predictions implied in the alternative hypotheses are
based on our presumption that companies, in the
absence of strong incentives to do otherwise, will
pursue a policy previously adopted if it is still
allowed. We by no means exclude a company-
specific motivation for any choices previously made
under the national GAAP (see Section 2), but our
focus is only on the company’s behaviour on
transition to IFRS.
4. Selection of countries, companies and
policy issues
Nobes (2006) suggests a series of hypotheses about
international differences under IFRS, mainly
expressed by using Germany and the UK as
exemplars of previously different accounting ‘sys-
tems’. We study companies from these two coun-
tries, but add Australia, France and Spain. The
rationale for this list of five is that, of the countries
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 05 ABR Nobes.3d Page 175 of 188
5Many UK companies do not have 31 December year-ends,
so their first IFRS reports related to years ending in 2006.
6 Australian usage of IFRS began, for most companies, on
1 July 2005.
Vol. 40, No. 2. 2010 175
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 23
:43
 25
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
where IFRS are compulsory for listed companies,
they had the five largest stock markets.7
Australia is different from the other four coun-
tries in not being a member of the EU. We do not
expect that, by itself, to cause differences in IFRS
practice.8 However, one particular feature of
Australian IFRS is relevant here: for two of the 16
accounting issues that we study, there was no option
in Australian IFRS in 2005–2006. So, Australian
policies on these issues in that period were not
choices. Nevertheless, the requirements in
Australian IFRS continued previous national
requirements, so this is consistent with our general
hypothesis that IFRS practice will preserve national
practice. Further, the IFRS options were re-inserted
in Australia for 2007–2008 reports onwards, so we
investigate whether Australian companies continue
with the ‘Australian’ policies on these two issues
even when they are not required to.
From each of the five countries, we select the
largest listed companies by examining the members
of the ‘blue chip’ indices, respectively the ASX 50,
CAC 40, DAX 30, IBEX 35 and FTSE 100. To
some extent, the different number of companies in
the indices adjusts for differences in the size of
stock markets. We exclude foreign9 companies and
those that do not use IFRS. The only country for
which the last point was a significant issue was
Germany where seven of the DAX 30 used US
GAAP. After these exclusions, we have a sample of
232 IFRS reports. This is a much larger set of
companies for our five countries than used by
KPMG and von Keitz (2006) or by ICAEW (2007).
Also, our sample is a complete set of domestic IFRS
reporters in the indices, whereas the samples in the
professional studies are likely to suffer from some
selection bias, as already noted. Table 1 shows the
sectoral distribution of the sample companies,
analysed by country.
The selection of large companies is justified for
both conceptual and practical reasons. Large com-
panies are probably more attentive than smaller
companies to the requirements and expectations of
the global investor community (e.g. Chaplinsky and
Ramchand, 2000; Wu and Kwok, 2002). Therefore,
international notions about ‘best practice’ under
IFRS will spread more rapidly among the large
companies. For that reason, whenever we observe
national differences in practice among the largest
companies, we expect that similar differences exist
among smaller firms, which are less likely to feel
international influences. For the topics discussed in
this paper, we can make inferences from the
samples of large companies to the whole IFRS-
reporting population that we could not make as
easily the other way round.
As noted earlier, sectoral issues affect some
accounting policies. For example, in the EU there
are three different versions10 of the Fourth Directive
(for banks, insurance companies and others) which
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 05 ABR Nobes.3d Page 176 of 188
Table 1
Country and sector* distribution
Australia UK France Spain Germany
0 Oil and gas 3 4 1 1 0
1 Basic materials 6 10 1 2 3
2 Industrials 5 6 7 8 3
3 Consumer goods 1 12 7 1 5
4 Health care 2 5 2 0 1
5 Consumer services 8 22 6 6 3
6 Telecommunications 1 3 1 1 1
7 Utilities 1 9 4 5 1
8 Financials 17 26 4 7 6
9 Technology 0 1 2 1 0
Total 44 98 35 32 23
* Sectors according to Industry Classification Benchmark.
7 For example, see data from the World Federation of
Exchanges, as at June 2005.
8 As explained earlier, the difference between EU-IFRS and
IFRS on the subject of IAS 39 is not relevant in our study.
9We define ‘foreign’ as meaning not legally registered in the
country. That is, for example, we exclude from the French
sample Belgian-registered companies that prepare IFRS state-
ments in the context of Belgian law. We exclude Rio Tinto from
the Australian sample because it is also in the FTSE 100 and
prepares IFRS statements in the context of UK law. We also
exclude AXA Asia Pacific from the Australian sample because
it is a subsidiary of AXA (France).
10 The Directives for banks (1986) and insurance companies
(1991) are derived from the fourth company law Directive ‘on
the annual accounts of certain types of companies’ of 1978.
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contain pre-IFRS requirements on many presenta-
tion and policy issues. For such (and other) reasons,
many empirical studies exclude banks and other
financial institutions. As a result, these companies
are under-researched. We include them. However,
for several of the policy issues that we study, it is
obviously appropriate to treat the banks or financial
institutions separately.
We examine the annual reports for 2005–2006,
that is those relating to accounting years starting in
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 05 ABR Nobes.3d Page 177 of 188
Table 2
IFRS policy choices
1 (a) income statement by function
(b) by nature
(c) neither
2 (a) inclusion of a line for EBIT or operating profit
(b) no such line
3 (a) equity accounting results included in ‘operating’
(b) immediately after
(c) after finance
4 (a) balance sheet shows assets = credits
(b) showing net assets
5 (a) liquidity decreasing in balance sheet (cash at top)
(b) liquidity increasing
6 (a) Statement of Changes in Equity, including dividends and share issues
(b) SORIE, not including them
7 (a) direct operating cash flows
(b) indirect
8 (a) dividends received shown as operating cash flow
(b) as investing
9 (a) interest paid shown as operating cash flow
(b) as financing
10 (a) only cost for PPE
(b) some fair value
11 (a) investment property at cost
(b) at fair value
12 (a) some designation of financial assets at fair value
(b) none
13 (a) capitalisation of interest on construction
(b) expensing
14 (a) FIFO for inventory cost
(b) weighted average
15 (a) actuarial gains and losses to SORIE
(b) to income in full
(c) corridor
16 (a) proportional consolidation of some joint ventures
(b) only equity method
Vol. 40, No. 2. 2010 177
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 23
:43
 25
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
2005. Many of these years begin on 1 January, but
some UK companies have chosen other dates
(especially 1 April), and many Australian com-
panies use 1 July. The 2005–2006 reports were the
first for which IFRS was compulsory11 in our five
countries, and they were also the last full set
available12 when we collected our data. All the
companies were subject to the same requirements,
as there were no changes to IFRS in this period.
Nobes (2006) identifies eight types of opportun-
ity for international variations in IFRS practice:
different versions of IFRS; different translations of
IFRS; gaps in IFRS; overt options; covert options;
measurement estimations; transitional issues; and
imperfect enforcement. For several of these,
detailed lists are provided: e.g. 18 overt options,
21 covert options. From these lists, we identified all
the issues13 for which data are observable in
published annual reports. The resulting 16 issues
of accounting policy are shown as Table 2. Nine of
these relate to presentation and seven to measure-
ment. Of the presentation issues, some are cosmetic
(such as issues 4, 5 and 6), whereas others (such as
issues 2, 3, 8 and 9) directly affect the content of key
items within the income and cash flow statements.
For our purpose, it is important to collect all the
available information on international differences in
IFRS policies. This is because on some other major
issues, e.g. the criteria for assessing impairments
(Ball, 2006: 17), it is not possible to detect and
measure differences. The more that we can demon-
strate systematic international differences for issues
that can be observed (however important or other-
wise), the more we can be confident that there will
be differences for important issues that cannot be
observed.
Our policy issues are not, of course, a random
selection. They are deliberately chosen as those for
which IFRS offers a choice and for which the
chosen policy is observable. We are not claiming
that the adoption of IFRS has led to no standard-
isation of practice. We are investigating whether
there remain substantial systematic international
differences in practice even under IFRS.
The data relating to the 16 accounting policy
issues of Table 2 are not available on any database
and were hand-picked from the annual reports14 for
the 232 companies in our sample. For many of the
issues, a full set of data was obtained. For a few
issues no data were available for some companies,15
because the issue did not apply or because of poor
disclosure.
5. Hypotheses
As explained in Section 3 we have a general null
hypothesis of similar IFRS practice across countries
that we analyse by a chi-square test. In addition, we
make pair-wise comparisons between countries on
all of the 16 issues covered by our study. The
hypotheses underlying these comparisons are
explained below. Our expectation is that pre-IFRS
national practices will continue. We briefly review
these practices and then set out our predictions for
the 16 issues of Table 2. In nearly all of our
hypotheses below, the pre-IFRS practices that we
refer to result from national requirements. We
assume that practices conformed with requirements
(especially for these easily visible practices of listed
companies, which were all audited by Big Four
audit firms). In three cases (issue 13 for Spain, and
issues 4 and 14 for the UK), we refer to predominant
pre-IFRS practice. Strictly speaking, we should
refer, company by company, to the actual pre-IFRS
practices. So, in Section 6, we do ask whether
particular companies continued with their pre-IFRS
policies, but that detailed approach is not necessary
for the general prediction of the IFRS practices of
companies.
1. Presentation of income statements (non-finan-
cials). The Spanish law of 1989 sets out a by-nature
format for the income statement. By contrast, the
pre-IFRS rules in all the other countries allowed by-
nature or by-function.We therefore predict for IFRS
practice that:
H1: Spanish companies are more inclined than
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 05 ABR Nobes.3d Page 178 of 188
11 Of our five countries, only Germany contained companies
voluntarily using IFRS immediately prior to 2005. Amajority of
our sample of German companies used IFRS before 2005.
However, we do not anticipate that this would affect policy
choices except where new options were introduced in 2005 or
shortly before. In our list of policy areas, the only new option
was to take actuarial gains and losses to the SORIE, introduced
in 2005. It is therefore possible that this recent option was more
likely to be ignored by German companies. However, this is still
a country-specific factor.
12 For example, reports for years ending in November 2007
were not available until well into 2008.We collected data during
the second half of 2007.
13 The 16 issues are all ‘overt options’. We excluded six issues
from Table 1 of Nobes (2006) because they related to
unconsolidated statements (the options in IASs 27, 28 and 31
concerning investor statements) or to rare issues on which little
or no data was available (commodity broker traders (IAS 2),
government grants (IAS 20) and revaluation of intangibles (IAS
38)). Similarly, it is not possible to gauge the use of ‘covert
options’ by using published annual reports. However, a few of
the overt options in Nobes (2006) cover several issues (e.g. the
treatments of interest and dividends in cash flow statements). So
we have separated them.
14We used the English language reports in all cases, but we
do not expect that this would affect our data.
15 See the ‘N’ numbers in Table 3.
178 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 23
:43
 25
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
others to use the by-nature format of the
income statement.
This is an important issue for analysis because it
is not possible for users to obtain the same
information16 from the two different formats.
2. Operating profit shown (non-financials). Pre-
IFRS national regulations on formats differ on
whether a sub-total for ‘operating profit’ should be
shown. There is such a line in the French plan
comptable général (section I.III.III) and in the
Spanish plan derived from it. Similarly, the formats
found in the German Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB
} 275) and the UKCompanies Act17 show operating
items (specifically thus labelled) separately from
others, although without specifically showing the
subtotal. By contrast, there were no such headings
or subtotals in Australia in ASRB 1018 (para. 4.1).
We therefore predict:
H2: Australian companies are less likely than other
companies to show a line for operating profit.
3. Treatment of equity-accounted profits (non-
financials). IAS 1 has few format requirements for
the income statement. However, its non-mandatory
implementation guidance shows equity-accounted
profit after finance costs and therefore outside of
operating profit. The same applies to the French
plan comptable général (Appendix to Chapter IV)
and the related Spanish requirements. By contrast,
the German HGB (} 275) and the UK standard
(FRS 9) show such profits after operating but before
finance items. There has been no clear tradition in
Australia. Many Australian companies do not show
an ‘operating’ heading (see 2 above). Pre-IFRS
guidance from AASB 1018 (para. 4.1) showed
equity-accounted profits after finance costs, as do
IFRS illustrations18 from Australian audit firms.
Given that the French and Spanish national
requirements show equity-accounted profits lower
down the income statement than in the other
countries which have a concept of ‘operating’, and
given that only in those countries are the require-
ments mandatory (for non-IFRS reporting), we
predict:
H3: French and Spanish companies are more
inclined than others to show equity-accounted
profits after finance items.
4. Presentation of balance sheets (non-financials).
The pre-IFRS requirement in Australia was in the
Corporations Law (and AASB 1034) which speci-
fied a format that showed ‘net assets’ but no total of
credit balances such as total shareholders’ funds and
liabilities. The same applied in Format 1 of the UK
Companies Act 1985 (CA 1985), which also
showed ‘net current assets’ and did not show total
assets. This was the predominant format used in
practice (Gordon and Gray, 1994: 76; and our own
survey of pre-IFRS policies of our companies,
discussed later). These can be called ‘financial
position’ formats, although the UK’s was a purer
form.
By contrast, the accounting plans of France and
Spain showed a two-sided T-account format, and
the German Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB } 266) had a
vertical version of this. In all three continental cases,
there is no heading for ‘net assets’ but there is a
heading for the total of the credit balances.
We therefore predict:
H4: Australian and UK companies are more
inclined than others to use a version of a
financial position format.
5. Liquidity order (non-financials). The pre-IFRS
regulations for balance sheets (referred to above)
show items in order of decreasing liquidity in
Australia but (except for banks) increasing liquidity
in the other four countries. Therefore, we predict:
H5: Australian companies are more inclined than
others to present liquidity-decreasing balance
sheets.
6. Statement of changes in equity. Only in the UK
did pre-IFRS rules (FRS 3) require a performance
statement in addition to the income statement. This
UK statement was the model for IAS 1’s statement
of recognised income and expense (SORIE) –
equivalent to the ‘other comprehensive income’ of a
later version of IAS 1– as opposed to the alternative
statement of changes in equity of IAS 1 (para. 97).19
So, we predict:
H6: UK companies are more inclined than others
to present a SORIE.
7. Method of calculation of operating cash flow.
Pre-IFRS rules on cash flow statements were
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 05 ABR Nobes.3d Page 179 of 188
16 For example, gross profit cannot be calculated from the by-
nature format.
17 Schedule 4 to CA 1985, now replaced by ‘Company
Regulations’ in Statutory Instruments.
18 For example, KPMG’s Reporting Under Australian
Accounting Standards, Example Public Company Limited (for
2007), p. 21; and PwC’s Value AIFRS Holdings, p. 63. 19We refer to the version of IAS 1 in force in 2005 and 2006.
Vol. 40, No. 2. 2010 179
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 23
:43
 25
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
lacking in detail in Germany and were noticeably
different from IAS 7 in France, Spain and the UK.
However, only in Australia was the direct method
required (AASB 1026) and this found its way into
the Australian version20 of IAS 7 that was in force in
2005–2006. However, IAS 7’s choice of the indirect
method was re-inserted into the version in force in
2007–2008, so we used data for that period for the
Australian companies (typically periods ending on
30 June 2008). Given that the direct method is more
onerous for preparers, we predict a continued21
avoidance of it elsewhere:
H7: Australian companies are more inclined than
others to use the direct method to calculate
operating cash flows.
8/9. Presentation of dividends received and interest
paid in cash flow statements (non-financials). IAS 7
(para. 33) suggests that dividends received might be
either operating or investing flows and that interest
paid might be either operating or financing, except
that financial companies ‘usually’ treat them both as
operating. In the UK, FRS 1 (para. 14) requires both
dividends received22 and interest paid to be shown
as ‘returns on investments and servicing of finance’.
In Australia, AASB 1026 (para. 7.1) required both
cash flows to be shown as operating. The French
requirement23 for consolidated statements is also to
show both dividends received and interest paid as
operating. There is no requirement for a cash flow
statement in Spain; rather the law24 requires a
statement of sources and applications of funds. In
Germany, cash flow statements are required for
listed companies (from 1999 onwards) but the pre-
IFRS rules lack detail.
There is therefore no clear national practice for
Germany or Spain, but we can predict:
H8: UK companies are less likely than Australian
or French ones to show dividends received as
operating.
H9: UK companies are less likely than Australian
or French ones to show interest paid as
operating.
10.Use of fair value to measure property, plant and
equipment (PPE). Pre-IFRS requirements in France,
Germany and Spain were to base measurement on
historical cost except for occasional revaluations in
France and Spain according to government regula-
tions (TRANSACC, 2001: 1162, 2263). Only in
Australia (AASB 1041) and the UK (FRS 15) was
revaluation freely allowed. We predict:
H10: Australian and UK companies are more
inclined than others to measure PPE at fair
value.
11. Use of fair value to measure investment
property. As for other PPE (above), pre-IFRS
requirements in France, Germany and Spain were
generally to measure investment property on a cost
basis. However, as for other PPE, there was an
option to use fair value in Australia. By contrast,
continuous valuation25 is required under UKGAAP
by SSAP 19. We therefore predict:
H11: The tendency to measure investment prop-
erty at fair value will be found in decreasing
order in the UK, Australia and continental
Europe.
12. Designation of financial assets to fair value
(non-financials). Pre-IFRS requirements concern-
ing the measurement of financial assets by non-
financial companies differed by country. German
law required measurement at cost or lower for all
assets (HGB } 253). French and Spanish accounting
laws were less resolutely opposed to measurement
above cost,26 so we use Germany in the hypothesis
below. UK law allowed various versions of market
value (CA 1985, Sch. 4, para. 31). UK standards
and Australian law and standards had no require-
ments in this area. We therefore predict for non-
financial companies:
H12: Australian and UK companies are more
inclined than German companies to desig-
nate financial assets to fair value.
Financial institutions had different laws (for
example, different Directives; see Section 4 and
Hypothesis 5) allowing marking to market. We do
not test hypotheses for financial institutions because
of the small number of such companies in our
sample of continental countries.
13. Interest capitalisation. The pre-IFRS require-
ment in Australia was to capitalise interest (AASB
1036). In Spain, the ICAC Resolution of 30 July
1991 deals with the issue in some detail, and it was
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 05 ABR Nobes.3d Page 180 of 188
20 That ruling in 2005–2006.
21 For example, all our UK companies used the indirect
method under UK GAAP in 2004–2005; see discussion later.
22 Except that dividends received from associates and joint
ventures are shown separately, also outside of operating.
23 Second Methodology, } 426.
24 Law 19/1989.
25 SSAP 19 (para. 11) requires measurement at ‘open market
value’ which is similar to fair value.
26 For example, revaluations of various assets were required
for listed companies in France in 1978 and in Spain in 1996.
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almost universal pre-IFRS practice of our com-
panies.27 By contrast, in the other three countries,
capitalisation of interest was allowed28 but was not
covered in detail in the regulations and was less
common.29 We predict:
H13: Australian and Spanish companies are more
inclined than others to capitalise borrowing
costs on construction.
14. Inventory flow assumptions (non-financials).
Excluding consideration of last in, first out (LIFO)
(which is not allowed in IAS 2), the UK and
Germany stand out as having predominant flow
assumptions in pre-IFRS national practice. In the
UK, FIFO was the normal practice (FEE, 1991:
164; as also confirmed in our own survey of pre-
IFRS policies). In Germany, weighted average was
generally required by tax law (TRANSACC, 2001:
1293). In Spain, although there was no legal
favouring of weighted average, there was also
evidence of a clear pre-IFRS preference for it (FEE,
1991: 167; Gonzalo and Gallizo, 1992: 114). In the
other two countries, no predominant basis was clear.
We therefore predict:
H14A: German companies are more inclined than
others (except Spanish) to use weighted
average only.
H14B: UK companies are more inclined than
others to use FIFO only.
15. Actuarial gains and losses. Most German DAX
companies were already using IFRS before 2005
when an extra option was added to IAS 19
(para. 93A) to allow actuarial gains and losses to
be taken in full to the SORIE. Therefore, they were
already using the corridor approach (IAS 19.92/93).
By contrast, the pre-IFRS requirement in the UK
(under FRS 17) was the same as the SORIE option.
Neither of these options was available in the laws of
the other three countries. So, we predict:
H15A: German companies are more inclined than
others to use the corridor approach.
H15B: UK companies are more inclined than
others to use the SORIE approach.
16. Proportional consolidation. Pre-IFRS rules in
Australia (AASB 1006) and the UK (FRS 9) did not
allow proportional consolidation of interests in joint
venture entities. By contrast, pre-IFRS French
regulations required proportional consolidation
(Loi sur les Sociétés Commerciales, Art. 357-3).
In Spain, the method was required30 in some
industries and common in others (Gonzalo and
Gallizo, 1992: 168). In Germany, proportional
consolidation was allowed and used by some
groups (TRANSACC, 2001: 1389). However, it
was not typical practice, as it had been banned in
Germany until 1987. We, therefore, predict:
H16: The tendency to use proportional consolida-
tion is found in the following countries in
decreasing order: France, Spain, Germany,
UK and Australia.
As in policy issue 7 above, there is a complica-
tion with the data for Australia. In the Australian
2005–2006 version of IFRS (i.e. AASB 131 in this
case), the proportional option in IAS 31.30 was
deleted. So we cannot measure policy choice for
2005–2006. However, the option was re-inserted
for 2007–2008, so we use data for that period.
6. Results
6.1. Tests of hypotheses
Table 3 shows the results of testing the above
hypotheses. First, it summarises the data collected
for the five countries relating to all the issues of
Table 2. For each country and issue, the table shows
the policies used, as percentages of the companies
for which the policy was observable (see the ‘N’). In
most cases, the data can be reduced to the percent-
ages using one policy out of two available in IFRS,
although in a few cases (e.g. issue 3) we record the
scores for three possibilities.
As explained earlier, we conduct two sorts of
statistical tests on these data. The chi-square test
measures the overall independence between policy
choice and country for each of the 16 issues. The
null hypothesis of similar practice is rejected at the
1% level for 14 issues and at the 5% level for two of
them.
Table 3 also shows the results of the binomial
tests. The testing of issues that have two choices is
carried out with conventional methods of approxi-
mations to the normal distribution. In practice we do
the same tests for the issues that have more than two
choices, by formulating the hypothesis with respect
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 05 ABR Nobes.3d Page 181 of 188
27We surveyed the 2004 annual reports for the companies
that specified their practice in 2005. Of the 17 companies, 16
capitalised interest, and one company capitalised some interest.
28 For example, by AktG } 255(3) in Germany, or CA 1985,
Sch. 4, para. 26(3)(b) in the UK.
29 For example, our survey of UK reports of 2004–2005
showed that 35% of companies disclosed a policy of capital-
isation. Only 13% disclosed a policy of non-capitalisation, but
our expectation is that this would have been the policy of the
non-disclosers.
30 At least, information on a proportional basis had to be
included in the balance sheet for joint ventures in the
construction industry (TRANSACC, 2001: 2314).
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to one specific alternative. It follows from the idea
underlying the alternative hypotheses that, for
testing purposes, the sample of companies from
each country should be treated as separate popula-
tions. When, for example, it is claimed that Spanish
companies are more inclined than others to present
an income statement by nature, the related testing
consists of pair-wise comparisons between the
scores of the Spanish sample and the scores of
each of the other samples, i.e. a total of four tests. If
we had been certain that the null hypothesis were
true for all companies except Spanish ones, we
might, of course, have pooled the scores of the latter
four for the purpose of the testing. However,
whether the statistical distributions are identical or
not is precisely the question we seek to answer, and
the consequence is that all samples are treated
separately. As we have designed the statistical
analysis, each of the four tests should result in a
non-rejection of the null hypothesis if it is true.
One problem that we encounter by this pair-wise
approach is that some of the samples compared are
under the threshold recommended for approxima-
tions to the normal distribution (typically 25, see for
example, Bhattacharyya and Johnson, 1977: 295).
In this study each single test is not essential for the
conclusion, so we report all results, being aware that
some of them may be based on insufficient sample
sizes.
Thus, hypothesis H1, which proposes that
Spanish companies have a greater tendency than
others to use an income statement by nature, was
tested pair-wise for each of the other four countries.
In all four cases, the null hypothesis that Spanish
choices are the same as others is rejected at the 1%
level.
We ran 82 binomial tests. Of these, 62 led to the
rejection of the null hypotheses at the 1% level, and
a further 12 tests did so at the 5% level. The
remaining eight tests did not enable rejection of the
null hypotheses but in six of these cases the data
were consistent with our alternative hypotheses.
In sum, there is a large amount of highly
significant evidence that policy choice under IFRS
varies internationally and is not random.
Furthermore, we have shown that the national
profile of IFRS practice is explained by national
pre-IFRS requirements (or predominant practice).
6.2. Comparisons with pre-IFRS practices
The above hypotheses largely concern the continu-
ation of policies previously required by national
GAAP. The only cases where we relied on
predominant national choices for our hypotheses
related to Spain (issue 13) and the UK (issues 4 and
14). A more precise hypothesis is that a particular
company continued with its particular pre-IFRS
policy choice. To test this, we looked at all the
2004–05 (pre-IFRS) reports of our Spanish and UK
companies for these issues. For issue 13 (capital-
isation of interest), 94% of Spanish companies31
maintained their pre-IFRS practice of capitalisation.
For issue 14 (FIFO, weighted average or a mixture),
all 6932 UK non-financial companies made exactly
the same policy choice under IFRS as they had done
pre-IFRS. For issue 4 (balance sheet format), 88%
of the UK companies maintained their policies.33
On the assumption (defended earlier) that, pre-
IFRS, our companies complied with national
requirements, Table 4 shows the policy switches
under IFRS. As can be seen, there are few such
switches (e.g. less than 3% of policies were
switched by Spanish companies). If we add in the
other policy issues for which there was no national
requirement, by studying the pre-IFRS practices of
the particular companies, we find similar results.34
7. Conclusions
The central objective35 of the IASB is to foster the
provision of comparable financial information for
participants in the world’s capital markets. This
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Table 4
Deviations per company from pre-IFRS national requirements
Australia UK France Spain Germany
N (= non-financials) 27.00 72.00 31.00 25.00 17.00
1. Average number of deviations 1.04 1.72 0.48 0.20 0.35
2. Maximum possible deviations 8.00 9.00 9.00 7.00 7.00
3. Average as percentage of maximum 13.00 19.00 5.40 2.90 5.00
31 Seventeen companies disclosed a policy for both years.
32 There were 72 non-financial companies in our UK data, but
three of them did not publish UKGAAP reports for 2004–2005.
33 Of the 69 companies, seven changed from showing net
assets to not doing so, and one changed the other way.
34 For example, for the UK, we add six more issues, and find
18.8% switches for all 15 issues. We omit issue 12 because there
was no pre-IFRS requirement or practice on designation.
35 IASB’s Preface to International Financial Reporting
Standards, para. 6.
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would be achieved if similar transactions were
measured and presented similarly throughout the
markets, i.e. uniform practice. The existence of
systematic differences in accounting policies due to
non-economic characteristics – such as country of
incorporation – is clearly contrary to this ambition.
This paper highlights 16 accounting issues for
which the literature identifies international differ-
ences in pre-IFRS reporting, and for which variation
within IFRS is allowed and is observable if it
occurs. An examination of the policies used by all
the domestic IFRS reporters in the stock indices of
five major capital markets for the first year of
compulsory IFRS adoption allows us confidently to
conclude that IFRS practice is subject to systematic
differences across countries.
The continuation of national traditions seems to
explain variations in IFRS policies between coun-
tries. However, that is merely a proxy for our more
precise hypothesis that a particular company con-
tinued with its pre-IFRS policies on transition to
IFRS. For each non-financial company of the five
countries, we compare its practice under IFRS with
pre-IFRS requirements and find that there were few
deviations from those earlier requirements. When
we extend this to look at policy switches even where
there was no pre-IFRS requirement, we again
confirm the preservation of previous practices.
Our research shows that systematic differences
exist both in trivial matters (such as the liquidity
order of the balance sheet) and in more complex
matters (such as the composition of cash flows from
operations or the treatment of actuarial losses).
Whereas the former are hardly any obstacle to
comparability, the latter most likely are. Some of
our policy issues are not as important as others but
they bolster the evidence for the existence of
national versions of IFRS practice. This allows
strong inferences to be made about variation in
practices that cannot easily be measured, e.g. the
tendency to make impairments.
We believe that our results are extensible in
various ways. First, we examined very large listed
companies. These are probably the least likely to
evince national practices. We expect that test results
would be at least as strong for other companies, but
this can be examined. Second, our choice of blue
chip companies limited the size of the sample,
especially for Germany. We do not expect that a
larger sample would change our results, except to
make them even stronger, but it would enable an
extended analysis of whether a company’s sector
affects its policy choices. This would add to our
findings of some differences between financial and
non-financial companies. Third, we examined 16
areas of policy choice. There are many others which
are less observable. For example, there are several
covert options and estimations in the issue of
impairment, such as whether to recognise impair-
ments, how to measure cash flows, and what
discount rate to use. National traditions (and,
specifically, previous practices of companies) are
likely to continue in some of these areas. It is not
clear how to examine these covert options, but other
researchers might try. Fourth, we examined five
countries, but would expect national versions of
IFRS to be observable in smaller IFRS-using capital
markets. Fifth, we concentrated36 on one year’s
worth of annual reports; mostly37 the first year of
IFRS adoption. Later research could address
whether companies gradually exploit options more
fully, at least up to reports published in 2010 when
some38 IFRS options will no longer be available. To
the extent that we look at data after 2005–2006 (for
2007–2008 for two Australian issues), we find
national practice continuing.
The five points above are limitations of our
research. A more general limitation is that, although
we can largely explain why particular companies
adopted particular IFRS policies in the context of
the transition to IFRS, more work is needed to go
deeper into why, over a long period, particular
policies have been preferred in particular countries
or by particular companies. For some issues
(e.g. the German preference against measurement
above cost), the literature is extensive. For others,
‘accidents’ are the apparent cause (such as the
German use of the ‘corridor’ pensions method
because German companies adopted IFRS before
other countries did, when the ‘SORIE’ method was
not available). For yet other issues (e.g. why the
Spanish prefer to capitalise interest), there is no
convincing theory. It might be necessary to theorise
about each policy choice, one by one, such that no
overall theoretical model would be explanatory.
We remind readers of other caveats. First, for
most of our hypotheses, we assume that, pre-IFRS,
national requirements were followed. We believe
that this is highly likely to be a correct assumption
for our large listed companies for our easily
observable policy choices. However, there might
be some exceptions. Second, for two of the policy
issues for Australia, companies had no choice in
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36 Although, we examined 2008 reports for two Australian
issues.
37 Except for the German companies.
38 Of our 16 issues, the presentation of the income statement,
the capitalisation of interest, and perhaps the treatment of joint
ventures will be affected, but not compulsorily until 2009 year-
ends or later.
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2005–2006. Although this does not alter our
findings about the continuation of pre-IFRS prac-
tices, these are different cases from all the other
countries and all the other issues. Nevertheless, by
substituting data for 2007–2008 (when there was a
choice), we can rectify that. This time, we need to
assume that a company would have chosen in
2005–2006, what it chose in 2007–2008. We know
of no reason to doubt that.
In addition to the possible extensions to our
research resulting from the limitations mentioned
above, another opportunity is to examine whether a
two-class model (Anglo-Saxon versus Continental
European) that was discussed39 before the adoption
of IFRS exists under IFRS. That is, for example, do
Australian and UK companies tend to choose IFRS
options in the same way (and perhaps in conformity
with US GAAP), at least compared to continental
European companies? A further possibility is to ask
why certain companies deviate from pre-IFRS
practices and national profiles, and why this is
more common for UK companies than for Spanish
ones (see Table 4).
Another issue to be investigated is whether
market participants are able to see through the
different policy choices. If it turns out that they can,
then the differences are less important for users and
regulators. However, investigations in this area are
complex, and previous studies (e.g. on LIFO
adoption) are both numerous and inconclusive.
There are policy implications from our findings.
We believe that options in accounting standards are
justified to the extent that they enable companies
with different economic characteristics to produce a
fair presentation of their activities. The systematic
differences in practice between countries, that we
document in this paper, are an unwanted corollary.
In our view the disadvantages of systematic differ-
ences outweigh the advantages of having options,
so we encourage the IASB to continue its efforts to
remove options. Second, analysts of financial
statements should be alert to the continuing inter-
national differences within ostensibly ‘inter-
national’ standards. Analysts might benefit from
knowing the national profiles when trying to
construct comparable figures. For example, it
might be helpful to know that French IFRS
companies tend to proportionally consolidate the
cash of joint ventures, to show interest paid as an
operating cash flow and to charge actuarial losses as
expense, whereas UK IFRS companies tend not to
do those things. It might also be helpful to know that
other, potentially more important, country-related
differences (e.g. on impairment) exist beneath the
surface of IFRS practice. Third, this variation in
IFRS practice is likely to be of interest to regulators,
especially to the SEC as it monitors IFRS practice of
foreign registrants and perhaps, in future, of US
companies. The SEC’s acceptance of IFRS has been
made on the assumption40 of further progress in
removing options.
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